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Market failures involving the sale of complex merchandise, such as residential property, 
financial products and credit, have principally been attributed to information 
asymmetries. Existing legislative and regulatory responses were developed having 
regard to consumer protection policies based on traditional economic theories that 
focus on the notion of the ‘rational consumer’. Governmental responses therefore seek 
to impose disclosure obligations on sellers of complex goods or products to ensure that 
consumers have sufficient information upon which to make a decision. Emergent 
research, based on behavioural economics, challenges traditional ideas and instead 
focuses on the actual behaviour of consumers. This approach suggests that consumers 
as a whole do not necessarily benefit from mandatory disclosure because some, if not 
most, consumers do not pay attention to the disclosed information before they make a 
decision to purchase. The need for consumer policies to take consumer characteristics 
and behaviour into account is being increasingly recognised by governments, and most 
recently in the policy framework suggested by the Australian Productivity Commission 
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for uniform consumer protections laws. The authors will use this policy framework to 
evaluate current Australian housing information disclosure laws relating to the 
purchase of residential property. The paper will highlight the policy and legislative 
assumptions behind the development of those laws and whether those laws are effective 
in minimising the behavioural biases which cause consumers in the housing market to 
make errors of judgment. It then will examine the options for strengthening the 
effectiveness of disclosure regimes in the housing market.  
 
I INTRODUCTION 
 
The effectiveness of consumer protection regulation in Australia was most recently 
examined by the Productivity Commission in its Review of Australia’s Consumer Policy 
Framework.
5
 The terms of reference make it clear that one of the government’s key 
considerations is ‘the need for consumer policy to be based on evidence from the 
operation of consumer product markets, including the behaviour of market 
participants’.6 Similarly the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) in its Summary Report of the Roundtable on Economics for Consumer Policy 
also highlighted similar concerns noting that current reasons for regulatory intervention 
in markets do not appear to be grounded on any principled notions of evidence based 
and ongoing assessment.
7
 Research in the United States
8
 suggests that the traditional 
approach of empowering consumers, through the provision of increasing amounts of 
information, without regard to its form or its comprehensibility is detrimental to 
consumer decision making.
9
 There is growing evidence to suggest that consumers do 
not take disclosed information into account in their decision making because they do 
not: 
 
 Read disclosure documentation given to them;  
 Understand the documentation if they do read it; and  
 Find the information useful. 
 
A study by Miller et al in 2006
10
 supports the general findings of the United States’ 
studies in the context of information disclosure in Queensland residential property 
transactions. The study found that Queensland property experts agreed with the need for 
disclosure of information to buyers, but doubted whether the benefit to consumers from 
the disclosure of information outweighed the cost and time involved in the preparation 
of complex documentation. As such, housing information disclosure laws were 
                                                 
5
  Productivity Commission, Review of Australia’s Consumer Policy Framework: Final Report (2008) 
<http://www.pc.gov.au/projects/inquiry/consumer/docs/finalreport> at 17 December 2009.  
6
  Ibid vol 1, vii. Comment about how the terms of reference were established under the Howard 
Government and it is still not clear how the Rudd Government will move things forward. 
7
  I McAuly, Roundtable on Economics for Consumer Behaviour: Summary Report (OECD, 2007). 
8
  C Jolls, and C R Sustein, ‘Symposium on Behavioral Realism: The Law of Implicit Bias’ (2006) 94 
California Law Review 969; C Camerer et al, ‘Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioural Economics 
and the Case for ‘Asymmetric Paternalism’’ (2003) 151 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 
1211; C R Sustein, ‘Informational Regulation and Informational Standing: Akins and Beyond’ (1999) 
147 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 613; S Stern, ‘Temporal Dynamics of Disclosure: The 
Example of Residential Real Estate Conveyancing’ [2005] Utah Law Review 57. 
9
  Acknowledged by the Productivity Commission, above n 5, vol 2, 33. 
10
  R Miller et al, ‘Is Mandatory Disclosure an Effective Consumer Protection Mechanism in Australian 
Real Estate Markets? The Perspective of Queensland Industry Experts’ (2006) Social Change in the 
21
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perceived to have caused an unfavourable impact by increasing the volume of 
information disclosed which has added to the complexity of compliance.  
 
The calls for change have been such that the OECD has recommended that while 
mandatory disclosure is important as a consumer protection tool, policy makers should 
explore its outcome based upon the direct and indirect consequences of consumer 
behaviour and other factors.
11
 Biases such as framing and information overload have the 
potential to result in a consumer making economically detrimental decisions to buy a 
property that is ultimately unsuitable.  
 
Australia’s housing information disclosure laws, as a consumer protection device, are 
part of a world-wide phenomenon. Governments globally have viewed mandatory 
information disclosure as a panacea for consumer disadvantage arising from a lack of 
knowledge about the product being purchased. For example, art 153 of the Treaty of 
Amsterdam states that ‘in order to promote the interests of consumers and to ensure a 
high level of consumer protection, the Community shall contribute … to promoting 
their right to information’.12 Two thirds of the states in the United States have legislated 
requiring property condition disclosure in real estate transactions.
13
 Provinces in Canada 
require property disclosure statements,
14
 in the United Kingdom, Home Information 
Packs are compulsory
15
 for anyone marketing a for sale, allowing ‘essential information 
to be made available up front’.16 Recently the Queensland government has introduced 
compulsory sustainability declarations upon the sale of a dwelling to: 
 
 increase community awareness of sustainable building features and thereby over 
time help to improve the sustainability of our community; 
 promote the relevance of sustainability features for the value of homes; 
 encourage sellers to improve the value of homes by adding sustainable building 
features; and 
 provide valuable information about how the features of an existing home compare to 
most of the mandatory minimum energy and water efficiency features of a new (or 
in some cases renovated) home.
17
 
 
Although there has been a wide-spread adoption of information disclosure laws for 
residential property, the rationales for instigation of different laws is by no means 
uniform and the reasons for Australian government action and the form of this action 
takes tend not to be based on sound theoretical bases. Consequently, it is difficult in the 
                                                 
11
  McAuley, above n 7. Also in its report, the Productivity Commission noted that ‘mandatory 
disclosure requirements have not worked well – sometimes confusing rather than informing 
consumers’: above n 5, vol 1, 11. 
12
  See S Haupt, ‘An Economic Analysis of Consumer Protection in Contract Law’ (2003) 4 German 
Law Journal 1137, 1139.  
13
  G Lefcoe, ‘Property Condition Disclosure Forms: How the Real Estate Industry Eased the Transition 
from Caveat Emptor to ‘Seller Tell All’’ (2004) 39 Real Property, Probate and Trust Journal 193, 
199. 
14
  For example, in Ontario there is the Seller Property Information Statement. 
15
  This obligation was imposed on sellers from 1 June 2007. 
16
  The Home Information Pack will include energy efficiency, searches and evidence of title, however 
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Government and the real estate industry. See Home Information Pack at 
<http://www.homeinformationpacks.gov.uk/?aspxerrorpath=/hip_content.aspx> at 17 December 
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  Explanatory Note, Building and Other Legislation Amendment Bill 2009 (Qld) 9. 
CHRISTENSEN, DUNCAN & STICKLEY (2009) 
4 
case of some disclosure legislation to discern a principled approach by governments to 
the introduction of mandatory vendor disclosure. In some cases governments have 
responded to pressure from the electorate or media campaigns professing what the 
public considers to be fair and just
18
 without obtain evidence (through research) that a 
problem exists. 
 
The application of potentially ineffective measures reflects the historical development 
of housing information disclosure laws that have been forged in a reactive fashion based 
on a multitude of ad hoc reasons instead of being guided by a comprehensive audit of 
existing practices to found the most optimal form of disclosure regulation. While there 
are legitimate reasons for ensuring buyers are fully aware of the attributes of the 
property being purchased and the terms of finance being provided, there is growing 
evidence to suggest that consumers do not take the disclosed information into account in 
making their decision because they do not read or understand disclosure documentation 
given to them or do not find it useful.  
 
This article will examine the effectiveness of Australian residential property information 
laws using the policy evaluation approach suggested by the Productivity Commission in 
its review. The model suggested by the Commission seeks to implement a more holistic 
approach by incorporating a consideration of market characteristics, analysis of 
information failures and a consideration of consumer behaviour. A comparison of the 
policy response based on the traditional market failure model and the new holistic 
policy model will be made with the aim of suggesting changes to existing residential 
property information disclosure laws. 
 
II NEW CONSUMER POLICY FRAMEWORK 
 
As part of the Productivity Commission’s Review of Australia’s Consumer Policy 
Framework, the Commission recommended an overarching objective for Australian 
consumer policy: 
 
Australian Governments should adopt a common overarching objective for consumer 
policy: ‘to improve consumer wellbeing by fostering effective competition and enabling 
the confident participation of consumers in markets in which both consumers and 
suppliers trade fairly and in good faith’. 
 
To provide more specific guidance to those developing and implementing consumer 
policy, this overarching objective should be supported by six operational objectives. 
The consumer policy framework should efficiently and effectively aim to: 
 
 ensure that consumers are sufficiently well-informed to benefit from, and 
stimulate effective competition; 
 ensure that goods and services are safe and fit for the purposes for which they 
were sold; 
 prevent practices that are unfair or contrary to good faith; 
                                                 
18
  For example, the New South Wales Minister for Fair Trading announced tightening of disclosure 
laws following a real estate agent’s failure to disclose to a prospective buyer that a house was the site 
of a triple murder (14 October 2004). Available at 
<http://www.findlaw.com.au/news/default.asp?task=read&id=21951&site=LE> at 17 December 
2009.  
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 meet the needs of those who, as consumers, are most vulnerable, or at greatest 
disadvantage; 
 provide accessible and timely redress where consumer detriment has occurred; 
and 
 promote proportionate, risk-based enforcement.19 
  
To give effect to the Productivity Commission’s recommended objective, a new process 
for evaluating policy instruments was suggested based upon a similar model put forward 
by the OECD.
20
 The new process is intended to ensure that a consumer protection 
problem exists and regulatory intervention is likely to provide a net community 
benefit.
21
 The model is reproduced below and this paper will refer to the model as the 
Policy Evaluation Model (PEM).
22
  
                                                 
19
  Productivity Commission, above n 5, vol 2, 41-2. 
20
  McAuley, above n 7. 
21
  Productivity Commission, above n 5, vol 2, 43. 
22
  Ibid vol 1, 14. 
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The PEM suggests a more sophisticated approach to the identification of a potential 
problem and the appropriate policy response. In contrast to the previously economically 
driven market failure approach, the PEM invites consideration of the following in 
identifying the problem: 
 
(i) What are the characteristics of the market that are affecting competition? Do 
monopolies operate, is there collusion and resale price maintenance? 
(ii) Is there an information failure? Doe the nature of the product mean that 
consumers are easily misled or cannot obtain information necessary to make a 
decision? 
(iii) What are the consumer characteristics impacting on consumer decision making? 
(iv) What are community expectations of fairness and ethical treatment in this type 
of transaction? 
 
The best practice approach advocated by the Productivity Commission at an operational 
level is:  
 
whenever a new policy initiative is contemplated, or an existing measure reviewed, there 
should be: 
 
 clear identification of the nature and source of the underlying problem; 
 quantification, to the extent reasonably possible, of the associated detriment, or 
 prospective detriment, for consumers, or groups of consumers; and 
 a comparison of the benefits and costs of all feasible options for dealing with the 
problem, including relying on market solutions, or employing approaches from 
outside ‘consumer’ policy.23 
 
The remainder of this article reviews and evaluates the effectiveness of current 
residential property information disclosure laws using the PEM and makes suggestions 
for changes to those laws that would result in a best practice approach. In accordance 
with the approach, first the problem will be identified and the associated detriment 
examined and secondly, the effectiveness of potential responses to the problem will be 
examined. 
 
III IDENTIFYING THE PROBLEM FACING HOUSING CONSUMERS 
 
A Common Law Obligations to Disclose 
 
A common theme underpinning vendor disclosure laws is the clear belief that the 
general law does not mandate sufficient disclosure nor provide effective remedies for 
that information failure. This information imbalance arises primarily from the operation 
of the principle of caveat emptor qui ignorare non debuit quod jus alienum emi (‘Let a 
purchaser, who ought not be ignorant of the amount and nature of the interest which he 
is about to buy, exercise proper caution’) which imposed a duty upon a buyer of land to 
be satisfied as to what he or she is to purchase with no corresponding duty on the seller 
to disclose information in relation to the property.
24
 The doctrine recognised that whilst 
                                                 
23
  Productivity Commission, above n 5, 46. 
24
  For a discussion of the origins of caveat emptor see A M Weinberger, ‘Let the Buyer be Well 
Informed – Doubting the Demise of Caveat Emptor’ (1996) 55 Maryland Law Review 387; and J B 
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a vendor could be deemed to have more knowledge of the property he or she owns than 
a prospective purchaser, the vendor is not deemed to know everything about the 
property nor does the vendor have any obligation at law to undertake their own searches 
of the land and disclose the results to the purchaser.
25
 
 
The doctrine of caveat emptor developed in the 16
th
 century when it could be assumed 
that the vendor and purchaser were of equal bargaining power and that the purchaser did 
not need special protection.
26
 Originally caveat emptor meant that a vendor was under 
no obligation to disclose latent or patent defects of a property to a prospective purchaser. 
A purchaser had no recourse should a property have a defect as the law did not impose 
upon a vendor a duty of disclosure – mere silence was not and is still not under the 
common law actionable without more.
27
 In response to the harshness of a strict 
application of the doctrine to a buyer, the law developed so as to allow a purchaser to 
rescind the contract if the vendor had failed to disclose a defect in the title of the 
property, if that defect was not discoverable by inspection of the property. It followed 
that to meet the common law obligation a vendor was required to disclose all registered 
and unregistered interests in the property (leases, easements, mortgages, covenants) but 
a significant number of other defects which related only to quality but nevertheless 
affected value (eg zoning, building defects, contamination, heritage) were not required 
to be disclosed.
28
  
 
The perceived imbalance of information between a seller and a buyer of real property 
arguably does require rectification. Prima facie, disclosure of information by a vendor is 
consistent with considerable literature advocating the advantages of using mandatory 
information disclosure as a response to a perceived lack of consumer information. 
29
 
Stern states in relation to disclosure of defects in real property, ‘the fundamental goals 
                                                                                                                                               
Pomeranz, ‘The State of Caveat Emptor in Alaska as it Applies to Real Property’ (1996) 13 Alaska 
Law Review 237. 
25
  Wilkes v Spooner [1911] 2 KB 473, 484-5 (Vaughan-Williams LJ); Zsadonvv v Pizer [1955] VLR 
496, 499-500 (Dean J). 
26
  See Pomeranz, above n 24, 238. 
27
  See for example Dormer v Solo Investments Pty Ltd [1974] 1 NSWLR 428 where a seller remained 
silent about a proposed pipeline that affected the value of the land. For further discussion refer to D 
Skapinker, ‘The Impact of the Trade Practices Act on Land Transactions’ (1996) 4 Australian 
Property Law Journal 107; E Webb, ‘Has Caveat Emptor Become Vendor, Lessor and Agent Emptor: 
Silence, s 52 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) and Real Property Transactions’ (1995) 3 
Australian Property Law Journal 122. 
28
  Kadissi v Jankovic [1987] VR 255, purchaser unsuccessfully sought to rescind contract for purchase 
of strata title dwelling upon grounds of the existence of serious structural defects. The vendor had 
made no statements about the structural soundness of the property; Tsekos v Finance Corporation of 
Australia Ltd [1982] 2 NSWLR 347, it was held that negotiations between a seller and the local 
authority for the resumption of property being sold did not have to be disclosed to a buyer. See also 
Carpenter v McGrath (1996) 40 NSWLR 39 where the lack of formal building approval for a shed 
was not a defect in title although there was a risk of a notice being issued by the local government to 
have it demolished. 
29
  See for example, G K Hadfield, R Howse and M J Trebilcock, ‘Information-Based Principles for 
Rethinking Consumer Protection Policy’ (1998) 21 Journal of Consumer Policy 131; A Schwartz 
and L Wilde, ‘Intervening in Markets on the Basis of Imperfect Information: A Legal and Economic 
Analysis’ (1979) 127 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 630; H Beales, R Craswell and S Salop, 
‘The Efficient Regulation of Consumer Information’ (1981) 24 Journal of Law & Economics 491; D 
Cayne and M J Trebilcock, ‘Market Considerations in the Formulation of Consumer Protection 
Policy’ (1972) 23 University of Toronto Law Journal 396; R Craswell, ‘Passing on the Costs if Legal 
Rules: Efficiency and Distribution in the Buyer-Seller Relationship’ (1991) 43 Stanford Law Review 
361. 
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of defect disclosure are to reduce informational asymmetries, create better matches 
between buyers and sellers, and increase the fairness of transactions.
30
 
 
The obvious information imbalance was recognised at the time of introduction of s 52A 
of the Conveyancing Act 1919 (NSW), which requires a vendor to attach prescribed 
documents to a contract of sale of land and imply conditions and warranties, it was 
stated: 
 
The vendor offering a property for sale has more knowledge that the purchaser about 
matters affecting the land, such as easements, restrictive covenants and government 
affectations. It is preferable for the vendor to furnish information about the property 
rather than to have purchasers competing to obtain sufficient information to be able to 
exchange contracts in confidence.
31
 
 
It also has to be acknowledged that there is little incentive for a rational vendor of real 
estate to voluntarily disclose negative aspects or a defect in the property to buyers 
because this knowledge will impact on the price a buyer is willing to pay.
32
 Economists 
argue that high quality sellers will voluntarily disclose information that is costless to 
verify. This will allow buyers to identify low quality sellers by their silence and 
discount the price accordingly.
33
 There is no evidence to suggest that high or medium 
quality sellers of real estate voluntarily disclose information about defects to buyers. 
One reason suggested for this is the lack of consequences for sellers of the failure to 
disclose under the common law.
34
 Therefore, the information balance in relation to 
attributes of the property affecting its value caused by the doctrine of caveat emptor has 
the potential to disadvantage buyers and lead to: 
 
                                                 
30
  Stern, above n 8, 67. 
31
  New South Wales, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Council, 13 November 1985, 9494 (The Hon 
J R Hallam (Minister for Agriculture and Fisheries)). 
32
  Refer to T S Ulen, ‘The Growing Pains of Behavioural Law and Economics’ (1998) 51 Vanderbilt 
Law Review 1747, 1751. 
33
  A Ogus, Regulation: Legal Form and Economic Theory (Hart Publishing, 2004). 
34
  Stern, above n 8, 69 (takes a long time for defects to become discoverable); K A Pancak, T J Miceli 
and C F Sirmans, ‘Residential Disclosure Laws: The Further Demise of Caveat Emptor’ (1996) 24 
Real Estate Law Journal 291, 305 (difficult to prove that the seller knew of a latent defect that failed 
to disclose). 
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(i) Buyers being in danger of exploitation due to a significant information imbalance in 
favour of the seller. For example, a seller who had knowledge that a gas pipeline 
was proposed for the property did not have to disclose this to the buyer. This non-
disclosure allowed the seller to dispose of the property to an unsuspecting buyer for 
a higher price than the buyer would have paid if the information was made known.
35
 
(ii) Buyers being unable to make a proper decision due to the unavailability of 
information about the quality of the land. This has the potential to result in buyers 
purchasing ‘lemons’ due to their inability to judge the quality of the property and the 
seller being unwilling to provide credible information.
36
 This is particularly evident 
in the case of structural defects in a property which could lead to the property being 
unsuitable for habitation but which a seller is not required to disclose.
37
  
 
Across Australia, there is general acceptance, both by governments and the judiciary,
38
 
that the information imbalance in the purchase of real property requires the seller to 
disclose relevant information to the buyer. This perceived need has led to all Australian 
jurisdictions, except the Northern Territory,
39
 legislating in respect of seller disclosure 
in real property transactions.
40
 The disclosure regimes in New South Wales,
41
 
Victoria,
42
 South Australia,
43
 Tasmania
44
 and the Australian Capital Territory
45
 attempt 
to redress this information imbalance by requiring sellers of residential property, 
(including strata title units) to disclose a significant amount of information related to 
both the title of the property and its value. In Queensland and Western Australia, only 
vendors of strata title property are required to make extensive disclosure about the body 
corporate affairs and property. The effectiveness of these different regimes will be 
evaluated by reference to the new policy approach advocated by the Productivity 
Commission. 
                                                 
35
  Dormer v Solo Investments Pty Ltd [1974] 1 NSWLR 428.  
36
  Stern, above n 8, 68. 
37
  See for example Carpenter v McGrath (1996) 40 NSWLR 39 where the lack of formal building 
approval for a shed was not a defect in title although there was a risk of a notice being issued by the 
local government; Franich v Swannell (1993) 10 WAR 459 (no obligation to disclose serious 
structural defects in the dwelling). 
38
  Marinkovic v Pat McGrath Engineering Pty Ltd [2004] NSWSC 571, [46]. See also Timanu Pty Ltd 
v Clurstock Pty Ltd (1988) 15 NSWLR 338, 339-40 (Kirby P). 
39
  The Department of Justice of the Northern Territory issued a discussion paper on vendor disclosure 
in 2006 with a view to amending the Law of Property Act 2000 (NT) to introduce vendor disclosure 
(see Northern Territory Government, Justice Department, Vendor Disclosure, Discussion Paper, 
2006). The Sale of Land (Vendor Disclosure) Bill 2007 (NT) was never introduced to Parliament 
following a submission from the Property Council and concerns expressed by industry bodies. At the 
time of writing, an exposure draft of the Sale of Land (Rights and Duties of parties) Bill 2009 (NT) 
had been released for public comment. The Bill addresses vendor disclosure and cooling off periods.  
40
  See Civil Law (Sale of Residential Property) Act 2003 (ACT); Conveyancing Act 1919 (NSW); Body 
Corporate and Community Management Act 1997 (Qld); Land and Business (Sale and Conveyancing) 
Act 1994 (SA); Property Agents and Land Transactions Act 2005 (Tas); Sale of Land Act 1962 (Vic); 
Strata Titles Act 1985 (WA). 
41
  Conveyancing Act 1919 (NSW) s 52A. 
42
  Sale of Land Act 1962 (Vic) s 32. 
43
  Land and Business (Sale and Conveyancing) Act 1994 (SA) s 7. 
44
  Part 10 of the Property Agents and Land Transactions Act 2005 (Tas), entitled ‘Land Transactions’, 
contains vendor disclosure requirements in div 2. Part 10 was never proclaimed to commence and in 
2009 the Property Agents and Land Transactions Amendment Bill was introduced to the Tasmanian 
Parliament to amend the uncommenced part. In particular, pt 10 will only apply to residential sales. It 
is anticipated that pt 10 will be proclaimed in the first half of 2010.  
45
  Civil Law (Sale of Residential Property) Act 2003 (ACT) s 10. 
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This analysis demonstrates that the main problem facing consumers of residential 
property is an information deficit or failure. The problem can be summarised as: 
 
(i) Sellers know more about the property being purchased; 
(ii) Sellers have no obligation at common law to disclose this information, unless it 
relates to the title to the property; and 
(iii) Significant information, which may impact on the value of the property cannot be 
easily discovered by the buyer. 
46
 
 
Traditionally, the existence of an information imbalance and the inability of the market 
to create voluntary obligations of disclosure have given sufficient impetus for 
government intervention. This intervention has usually been in the form of a 
requirement for mandatory information disclosure by sellers of residential property to 
buyers, prior to the buyer signing the contract. Is this a true characterisation of the 
problem? Will an application of the PEM also result in a case for intervention and 
would that intervention be in the same form? 
 
B Are Market Characteristics Responsible for the Problem? 
 
This may require consideration of a number of issues.
47
 First, is there a market failure? 
For an economically efficient outcome, markets rely upon parties possessing sufficient 
information to enable a decision that is in their best interest to be made. To be 
economically efficient it is not necessary that parties to the transaction possess all 
information, merely that they possess sufficient information. As stated by Schwartz and 
Wilde: 
 
The existence of imperfect information is commonly thought to justify market 
intervention by courts and legislatures because of the predominant belief that an 
imperfectly informed buyer cannot make utility-maximising purchase choices.
48
 
 
When markets work well in the sense that they are characterised by competitive rivalry, 
vendors will have an incentive to provide information voluntarily. Arguably, the sale of 
a residence by its owner may be characterised as workably competitive. It is a one-off 
transaction and the vendor has no desire to establish a reputation in the market, but the 
vendor wishes to sell in competition with other vendors with similar properties in the 
same geographical market. In such a competitive market, there will be an incentive to 
provide information to the prospective purchaser. However, the incentive to disclose 
information would not include the disclosure of any negative aspects, instead the 
disclosure would focus on the favourable aspects of the property. These favourable 
characteristics, although relevant to a purchaser, would not provide a complete picture 
to enable the purchaser to make an informed decision about the purchase as has been 
demonstrated by the erosion of the doctrine of caveat emptor.  
                                                 
46
  This summary arises from the analysis in part 1 of this paper. Further details appear in S Christensen, 
W D Duncan and A Stickley, ‘Evaluating Information Disclosure to Buyers of Real Estate – Useful 
or Merely Adding to the Confusion and Expense?’ (2007) 7 Queensland University of Technology 
Law and Justice Journal 148. 
47
  These three categories are referred to in I Ramsay, Consumer Protection, Text and Materials 
(Wildenfeld and Nicholson, 1989) 34, cited in A B Overby, ‘An Institutional Analysis of Consumer 
Law’ (2001) 34 Vanderbilt Journal of Transitional Law 1219, 1227. 
48
  Schwartz and Wilde, above n 29, 682. 
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The market for residential property has characteristics identified by Hadfield et al
49
 as 
reducing the likelihood that a market based solution will emerge, such as a lack of 
repeat transactions, the cost to consumers of an unwise decision are potentially 
catastrophic and the cost of obtaining resolution through the courts is too costly. 
However, on the positive side the anticompetitive behaviour (resale price maintenance, 
monopolies, cartels) characteristic of markets for the sale of goods and other products is 
rare. A more likely scenario is that a seller will engage in anti-consumer behaviour, such 
as misleading conduct, pressure tactics or harassment to effect a sale. This is due to both 
the nature of the participants in the market and the nature of the product. 
 
The participants in the real estate market are diverse, ranging from naïve first time 
buyers and sellers to sophisticated investors and property developers. Unlike other 
consumer goods, the purchase of a residential property is not a transaction entered into 
on a recurrent basis nor is it a transaction where purchasers can alter their purchasing 
decision to punish sellers that do not provide appropriate information. Consequently, 
there is no incentive for sellers, who may only sell a property once or twice to disclose 
adverse matters to buyers, who they may never deal with again. The inability of the 
market to deal with information failures is compounded by the nature of residential 
property as a product. 
 
First, each property is generally unique. This makes comparison by buyers almost 
impossible, unless there are a number of similar properties for sale in the same area. For 
example, where a number of strata title properties are for sale in the same street with 
similar views and similar features, a seller may be encouraged to provide additional 
warranties concerning quality or discount the price to ensure a sale. In most other cases, 
houses will have different features, views and be of differing quality. Consequently, the 
decision to buy is often based on a personal assessment of the cosmetic attributes and 
position of the property, rather than what the seller has disclosed. 
 
Secondly, the discovery of adverse impacts on the quality of residential property is often 
not ascertainable until after a buyer takes possession and, in some cases, not until years 
later. Latent defects in the structure of buildings on the property,
50
 local government 
decisions to resume part of the property for infrastructure
51
 and flooding levels for the 
property are some of the matters that can affect the use and value of land and which are 
not easily ascertainable prior to purchase. 
 
An analysis of the market for residential property suggests that there are no 
characteristics of the market that will force a vendor to disclose all matters about a 
property that impact on a buyer’s decision to purchase unless required by regulation. 
 
C What is the Nature of the Information Failure? 
 
The second key question suggested by the PEM is whether the nature of the product 
means that consumers are easily misled or cannot obtain information necessary to make 
a decision? In the case of land, the complex nature of the information and the impact of 
adverse information on value is also a factor. This complexity creates the potential for a 
                                                 
49
  Hadfield, Howse and Tebilcock , above n 29, 155-6. 
50
  Bryan v Maloney (1995) 182 CLR 609; Ryan v Hooke (1987) Q ConvR 54-238. 
51
  Dormer v Solo Investments Pty Ltd [1974] 1 NSWLR 428; Tsekos v Finance Corporate of Australia 
[1982] 2 NSWLR 347. 
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buyer of property to be misled by statements or actions of a seller or be unable to 
ascertain or substantiate important factors that impact on the value of the property. A 
majority of these factors such as registered leases, easements, mortgages, heritage 
listing, contamination and local government orders and notices can be readily 
discovered in most Australian jurisdictions through a search of the appropriate 
government register. Other significant factors however, such as building defects, 
proposed resumptions, pest infestations, unregistered or potential interests in land
52
 and 
flooding are harder to ascertain. In most cases, a seller will be aware or have become 
aware of factors affecting the property during occupation. At law, a seller is only 
required to disclose to a buyer the factors affecting the title to the land. This will include: 
 
(i) the real property description of the property; 
(ii) whether there are any interests affecting the title (and will not be removed prior to 
settlement) such as leases, easements, mortgages that are registered or 
unregistered; 
(iii) registered and unregistered statutory encumbrances such as local government 
sewerage and drainage easements. 
 
This leaves an abundance of information about a property that a seller is not required to 
disclose. Very few sellers will voluntarily disclose adverse information about the 
property being sold as this will impact on the price a buyer is willing to pay. The nature 
of the information not required to be disclosed at law can in some cases impact 
significantly on the value of the land such as heritage listing which may preclude 
redevelopment,
53
 non-compliance with local authority conditions relating to approval 
for a specific use,
54
 unauthorised alterations to a building under contract,
55
 and even the 
total absence of building approval.
56
 Does the nature of the information not disclosed by 
a seller justify intervention or should a buyer be required to ascertain further 
information. This depends to some extent on whether the information is readily 
available. 
 
In most Australian jurisdictions restrictions on the use or occupation of land can be 
ascertained through a search of a relevant body. In Queensland this means a buyer will 
have to undertake 25 searches to find all information relevant to the use and occupation, 
and therefore value of the land: The table below provides a summary.
57
 
 
Search/ Relevant Entity Type of information 
Local government Enquiries 
 Rates search 
 Town planning search 
 Sewerage and drainage plans 
Rates information, town planning 
information (zoning, use, future use), 
position of sewerage and drainage pipes, 
infrastructure agreements affecting the 
                                                 
52
  See for example Dormer v Solo Investments Pty Ltd [1974] 1 NSWLR 428 where a seller did not 
have to disclose the potential in the future for a pipeline to be laid across the property requiring an 
easement, despite the seller having knowledge of this. 
53
  Brett v Cumberland Properties Pty Ltd [1986] VR 107, 110 (Starke J). 
54
  Re Stranbay Pty Ltd and Catlow Pty Ltd (1985) Q Conv R 54-180.  
55
  Mc Innes v Edwards [1986] VR 161, 165 (Kaye J); Also Barber v Keech (1987) 64 LGRA 116, 123 
(Kelly SPJ).  
56
  Carpenter v McGrath (1996) 40 NSWLR 39, 52-3.  
57
  Queensland Conveyancing Protocol (2008) Queensland Law Society 
<http://www.qls.com.au/content/lwp/wcm/resources/file/ebc03e4640b5593/Qld%20Conveyancing%
20Protocol%20v3%20_10%20September%202008.pdf> at 18 December 2009. 
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 land, any outstanding IA obligations, any 
prosecutions for development offences, 
any plumbing or building show cause or 
enforcement notices, any outstanding 
charges against the land 
 Flood search 
 
Whether the property has flooded and the 
level of the last flood 
 Building approval search 
 
Details of building approvals and 
certificates (including certificate of 
classification) 
 Health Department search 
 
Whether the property is registered with 
the Health Department and any 
contraventions 
 Swimming pool compliance 
 
Compliance with swimming pool 
legislation 
 Heritage search 
 
Whether property listed on heritage 
register or any heritage agreements in 
existence 
Vegetation Protection Orders 
Details of whether vegetation on the 
property is protected vegetation or 
subject to an order 
  
(Search of register held by relevant local 
government) 
Land Tax Whether the property is subject to land 
tax, if there are arrears and the amount of 
arrears 
Qld Transport  
 Roads 
 Port authority (only if on the river) 
Rail 
Current proposals, resumption 
information for roads, ports and rail 
 
(QT will not provide information on 
proposals for resumptions not currently 
approved) 
Main Roads 
 
Current proposal and future intentions for 
roads 
Queensland Building Services 
Authority 
Details of insurance cover for the 
property under the Queensland Building 
Services Authority Act 
Environmental Protection Agency  
 
 
Determine if land is on the 
Environmental Management Register or 
Contaminated Land Register* 
Vegetation Management 
(State) 
Details of  
 Vegetation Clearing Applications 
 Regrowth Vegetation 
Notifications 
 Vegetation offsets 
 
(Search 3 registers in Dept Environment 
and Resource Management) 
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Energex/Ergon 
 
 If the property is connected under 
normal tariff conditions; 
 if the property is connected under 
guarantee conditions and the 
amount of the guarantee; 
 if the property is not connected 
upon what conditions it may be 
connected; 
 whether there are any 
underground cables running 
through the property.  
 
Powerlink 
Information concerning the Authority’s 
future interest in the property, easements 
and transmission lines 
Court Registers 
 Supreme and District 
 Bankruptcy register 
 If an action has been commenced 
by or against the seller; 
 the nature of any action 
commenced; 
 copies of all originating summons, 
interlocutory proceedings, orders, 
appeals, bills of costs and writs; 
 the bankruptcy register should 
provide information concerning 
name of bankrupt, dates of 
bankruptcy, and orders 
Body Corporate Records Search  
Only if the property is subject to the 
Building Units and Group Titles Act 1980 
or the Body Corporate and Community 
Management Act 1997 
Levy information, by-laws, lot 
entitlement, insurances, details of 
management and letting agreement, 
referee’s orders, special levies 
Body Corporate Orders (Form 3 
BCCM) from Body Corporate 
Commissioner 
Details of Orders made against a 
particular community title scheme 
Qld Fire and Rescue Search 
This only applies to commercial building 
and units 
Whether a fire safety certificate has been 
issued for the property, whether the 
property complies 
Bill of Sale Register 
Only if purchasing chattels, usually 
commercial property 
Details of registered bills of sale 
Coastal Management Search 
Whether the land is within a coastal 
management control district or an 
erosion-prone area and therefore the 
provisions of the Coastal Protection and 
Management Act 1995 applies 
Coastal Protection (Sanctions on 
construction of jetties) 
 the date of any sanction issued 
pursuant to s 86 of the Harbours 
Act 1955 (now part of the 
Transport Infrastructure Act 
1994) 
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 nature of the works sanctioned 
National Heritage Listing Information on indigenous, natural and 
historic sites on the register 
Mining tenures Details of mining or petroleum tenures 
granted 
Telco search Major telecommunication network cables 
(including Optic Fibre) belonging to 
Telstra, Optus, UEComm, AAPT and 
PowerTel and other providers that pass 
through the property and information on 
communications network that may impact 
on the property 
  
A buyer who undertakes these searches may still not find all relevant information that 
may impact on a buyer’s decision to buy the property. Some adverse factors are not 
discoverable upon a reasonable inspection of the property, such as the presence of 
termites and other serious building defects,
58
 crimes that may have occurred on the 
property
59
 and most significantly proposed actions by government to resume 
properties
60
 or grant mining leases
61
 that cannot be discovered from any search. 
 
D What are the Consumer Characteristics Impacting on Consumer Decision 
Making? 
 
The need to address the general effectiveness of information disclosure through a 
consumer behaviour model has gained greater acceptance in the last decade.
62
 As part of 
the PEM, governments are being urged to consider the impact on consumer behaviour 
on the proposed policy response.  
 
Under a traditional economic model the natural response to market failure arising from 
a lack of information is to require more information to be given. Under a behavioural 
model, this is likely to worsen the problem for consumers depending upon the 
behavioural preferences and cognitive abilities of the consumer. Behavioural economics 
rejects the assumption that consumers behave rationally and has determined through 
experiment and empirical observation that consumers depart from predicted rational 
                                                 
58
  Termites: Franich v Swannell (1993) 10 WAR 459; Walker v Masillamani [2007] VSC 172; Eighth 
SRJ Pty Ltd v Merity (1997) 7 BPR 15,189, 15,193. Structural defects: Mitchell v Valherie [2005] 
SASC 350; Kadissi v Jankovic [1987] VR 255; Carpenter v McGrath [1996] 40 NSWLR 39. 
59
  Hinton v Commissioner for Fair Trading, Office of Fair Trading [2007] NSW ADTAP 17 (a murder 
that occurred in the house was not disclosed). 
60
  Dormer v Solo Investments Pty Ltd [1974] 1 NSWLR 428; Tsekos v Finance Corporation of 
Australia Ltd [1982] 2 NSWLR 347.  
61
  Borda v Burgess (2003) 11 BPR 21,203 (failure to disclose a mining lease over the property, held not 
to be a defect in title because the coal was not being sold). 
62
  Jolls and Sunstein, above n 8; C R Sunstein, ‘The Future of Law and Economics: Looking Forward: 
Behavioural Analysis of Law’ (1997) 64 University of Chicago University of Chicago Law Review 
1175; C Jolls, C R Sunstein and R Thaler, ‘A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics’ (1998) 
50 Stanford Law Review 1471 (individuals realistically display only bounded rationality, bounded 
willpower, and bounded self-interest); R B Korobkin and T S Ulen, ‘Law and Behavioural Science: 
Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics’ (2000) 88 California Law Review 
1051. 
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behaviour due to behavioural biases.
63
 Despite the lack of empirical evidence in the 
context of a land transaction, a number of behavioural biases can be identified as having 
a potential impact on the way a consumer interacts with information about property:
64
  
 
(i) Choice/information overload: economic models suggest that the benefit from 
extra choice is unfounded. Research in diverse products suggests however, that 
past a point, when provided with more choice, a consumer either walks away 
from the market, or chooses randomly. Research shows that consumers who are 
presented with too much information, legalease or a dense form of words tend 
not to read the document.
65
 This is especially relevant in the case of real estate 
transactions where disclosure of a significant amount of information is mandated. 
(ii) Framing biases: we are influenced not only by the objective information 
provided but also by how that information is framed (ie 3% fat or 97% fat free). 
Each disclosure regime mandates a different form of disclosure and therefore 
provides a different frame for consideration by consumers. 
(iii) Anchoring and investment: individuals anchor on to initial values so that even 
when that value is uninformative, it influences the final judgement of price, 
probability or other matters. Where individuals have invested time or money into 
a transaction, there is a tendency to remain in the transaction despite later 
prejudicial information that rationally should suggest withdrawal from the 
transaction. The timing of disclosure is therefore of significant importance with 
consumers more likely not to enter a transaction than to end a transaction if an 
adverse matter is disclosed.
66
 
 
In the absence of a vendor disclosure regime, these behavioural biases may have the 
following impacts: 
 
(i) The information which can be discovered through inquiries is complex and not 
presented in a way that is easy for the average buyer to locate or comprehend 
without legal advice. This may contribute to buyers either not reading the 
information at all or ignoring it as being too difficult to understand. As can be 
seen from the Queensland example an unrepresented buyer is unlikely to 
undertake the 25 searches necessary to locate relevant information. Even if the 
searches are undertaken the complexity of the information produced means a 
buyer is unlikely to either read all the information or fully comprehend the 
consequences.  
(ii) The majority of information is not readily available at the time of contract with 
buyers usually being advised of adverse impacts, after entry into the contract and 
payment of a deposit. The cost of searches contributes to the buyer behaviour of 
only undertaking searches after contract. This is likely to increase the anchoring 
and investment bias which may lead to a buyer deciding not to terminate 
because of the money already spent and the uncertainty of recovering the deposit. 
 
These biases suggest that while consumers require a certain amount of information to 
make an informed decision, any policy response needs to take into account: 
                                                 
63
  A number of behavioural biases have been identified in the literature. For a summary refer to 
McAuley, above n 7, 11-12. 
64
  Stern, above n 8. 
65
  M A Eisenberg, ‘Comment: Text Anxiety’ (1986) 59 Southern California Law Review 305. 
66
  Stern, above n 8. 
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(i) The impact too much information or irrelevant information will have upon the 
decision of a consumer; 
(ii) Whether the way in which the information is presented will impact on the 
decision of the consumer; and 
(iii) At what point in time should information be made available to the consumer.67 
 
Consumer behaviour will also be relevant as to whether information disclosure should 
be supported by other mechanisms such as cooling off periods, statutory warranties and 
consumer education. 
 
E Are there any Community Expectations of Fairness and Ethical Treatment in 
this Type of Transaction? 
 
The response of the New South Wales Fair Trading Minister, Reba Meagher to the case 
involving a failure by a real estate agent to disclose the fact a triple murder occurred in a 
house, exemplifies the community expectations in the sale of a house:  
 
Buying a home is the largest and most important investment decision most consumers 
will ever make. Homebuyers have a right to know the details about a property that may 
affect the value of that property or their decision to buy it.
68
 
 
There is a community expectation that ethically a vendor of real estate should disclose 
relevant information influential in the decision making process of the purchaser. 
Mandatory disclosure of information concerning the purchase of a residence may be 
imposed to achieve this ethical goal – that is, ensure that the purchaser who is naturally 
in a lesser position than the vendor in respect of knowledge of the property is not taken 
advantage of.  
 
The reasoning behind this notion is that a lack of a duty upon a vendor to disclose 
information about the property being sold except so far as the requirements of the 
principle of caveat emptor, may lead to over inflated prices being paid for property. 
This could lead to a failure of a market. Market efficiencies and increasing the 
protection of consumers rely upon the consumers being informed. Lack of disclosure in 
the transaction may lead to a lack of confidence in the property market. For example, 
the Queensland Government introduced reforms to the business of real estate when two-
tiered marketing was taking place in property development. The Explanatory Notes to 
the Property Agents and Motor Dealers Amendment Bill 2001 (Qld) state: 
 
marketeers have altered their operating tactics to avoid the requirements of the [Property 
Agents and Motor Dealers Act 2000 (Qld)]. They have adopted unconscionable practices 
which continue to result in massive consumer detriment and the erosion of public 
confidence in the benefits of investing in the Queensland property market.
69
 
                                                 
67
  These factors have been referred to previously in L Griggs, ‘Intervention or Empowerment – 
Choosing the Consumer Law Weapon’ (2007) 15 Competition and Consumer Law Journal 111; 
Christensen, Duncan and Stickley, above n 46. 
68
  Refer to Gonzales Murder House Leads to New Disclosure Laws (2004) Find Law 
<http://www.findlaw.com.au/news/default.asp?task=read&id=21951&site=LE> at 17 December 
2009. 
69
  Explanatory Notes, Property Agents and Motor Dealers Amendment Bill 2001 (Qld) 1. See also 
Jenkins v Kedcorp Pty Ltd [2002] 1 Qd R 49, 52 for a description of the process of two tier 
marketing. 
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Information disclosure in this sense therefore carries with it notions of fairness restoring 
some symmetry to the transaction.
70
 By requiring a vendor to disclose relevant 
information to a purchaser it allows the purchaser to make an informed decision about 
whether to purchase or not – and thereby improves the fairness of the transaction, 71 
what is arguably an ethical goal. Providing information to the purchaser ensures that the 
vendor is not taking deliberate advantage of the purchaser’s ignorance and encouraging 
them to enter into an economically disadvantageous transaction. 
 
IV DETERMINING THE POLICY RESPONSE 
 
The PEM suggests that regulators take into account consumer behaviour in the 
identification of the problem. The same factors are relevant to a determination of the 
policy response. McAuley
72
 suggests that intervention in a market by regulators should 
take account not only of market failure arising from a lack of information failure but 
also the contribution of consumer biases to the market failure and model the response 
accordingly. Intervention based on behavioural biases should, however, aim to benefit 
less rational consumers while not detrimentally affecting rational consumers (for 
example, in financial and similar markets protection of naive consumers should not 
distort the decision making of disciplined or well-informed consumers).
73
 Regulation 
should also aim to address the problem with a minimum of cost to the community.  
 
The problem as identified in the above analysis is that buyer’s of property are 
disadvantaged under the common law through a lack of readily accessible information 
about factors impacting on the use and value of the property. The information which can 
be discovered through inquiries is complex, originates from a variety of sources and is 
not presented in a way that is easy for the average buyer to comprehend without legal 
advice. The information is not readily available at the time of contract with buyers 
usually being advised of adverse impacts after entry into the contract and payment of a 
deposit. 
 
The traditional policy response to this problem is for regulators to prescribe the 
mandatory disclosure of information. By disclosing relevant information it is reasoned 
that purchasers may choose not to buy the property or may negotiate a lower purchase 
price if they are willing to take on the defects disclosed.
74
 Effective mandatory 
disclosure should however take into account the complexity of the information and the 
consumer behavioural biases discussed above. Current vendor disclosure regimes in 
Australian jurisdictions have to date focused on the content and process.
75
 There has 
been little research or analysis of the relevance of the information being disclosed, or of 
the form and presentation of the document if there is one prescribed to discover whether 
the information is being read and understood by purchasers.  
                                                 
70
  See also: New South Wales, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Council, 13 November 1985, 9494 
(The Hon J R Hallam (Minister for Agriculture and Fisheries)) on the introduction of s 52A of the 
Conveyancing Act 1919 (NSW). 
71
  Ulen, above n 32, 1751; Stern, above n 8, 67. 
72
  Above n 7, 11-12. 
73
  Camerer et al, above n 8, 1254. The adoption of asymmetric paternalism as a standard is noted, 
McAuley, above n 7, 13. 
74
  See Stern, above n 8, 67. 
75
  See for example Tasmania Law Reform Commission and the Justice Department of the Northern 
Territory.  
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A Information Overload 
 
According to economic theory, disclosure of information is workable if optimal 
information is achieved. ‘Optimal information’ is achieved when the marginal benefit 
derived from the information provided is approximately equal to the marginal cost of 
providing it.
76
 The administrative and compliance costs associated with information 
disclosure may exceed the value of the information to the consumer.
77
 If costs of 
compliance exceed the value or marginal benefit of the information, the government 
should not intervene.  
 
Behavioural economics recognises however that optimal information may lead to 
‘information overload’, that is, purchasers should not have non-useful information 
provided in a legal document nor should the information be too detailed or technical. 
‘Information overload’ may result in the purchaser being unable to understand the 
information being provided. More information is not necessarily better from the 
purchaser’s point of view. While purchasers may derive a measure of reassurance as the 
level of information provided increases, their ability to make an effective decision may 
decrease.
78
 Further, inclusion of additional information that may not be as relevant to 
the transaction may lead to the purchaser ignoring other more important information.
79
 
 
For example, one of the objectives of The 1999 National Survey of Perceptions of the 
Franchising Code of Conduct was to determine the extent to which the Code provides 
better information to franchisees to enable them to make an informed decision about 
investing in a franchise. The findings show that only 25.9% of respondent franchisees 
described the disclosure document as either important or very important, as compared 
with 27.7% who described it as not important. Only 29.8% of respondents found the 
disclosure useful or very useful.
80
 Of the franchisors surveyed, 63.9% claimed that the 
disclosure requirements had involved additional costs such as legal and/or accounting 
advice.
81
 
 
Research is necessary to determine the relevant information a purchaser will use in 
making an informed decision about the purchase of residential property. Unless the 
information provided to the purchaser is relevant to their decision, vendor disclosure is 
merely adding unnecessary costs to the transaction. It then becomes regulation that 
achieves no purpose – it is simply imposing additional regulatory burden - red tape with 
which a vendor must comply and for which there is no perceived benefit.  
                                                 
76
  Ogus, above n 33, 39. 
77
  Ibid 133. 
78
  Haupt, above n 12, 1142. See also G S Day, ‘Assessing the Effects of Information Disclosure 
Requirements’ (1976) 40 Journal of Marketing 42, 46 where it refers to studies (J Jacoby, D E 
Speller and C A Kohn, ‘Brand Choice Behavior as a Function of Information Load’ (1974) 11 
Journal of Marketing Research 63) that revealed that the more information provided, poorer 
purchase decisions were made but the purchasers felt more satisfaction with their decisions. D M 
Grether, A Schwartz and LL Wilde, ‘The Irrelevance of Information Overload: An Analysis of 
Search and Disclosure’ (1986) 59 South California Law Review 277, 285 notes that consumers report 
greater satisfaction with purchases if they perceive that they have more information to base their 
decision upon even if they did not use that information in their decision process. 
79
  See Camerer et al, above n 8, 1235. 
80
  Australian Franchising Industry, The 1999 National Survey of Perceptions of the Franchising Code 
of Conduct prepared for the Office of Small Business, Canberra by Lawler Davidson Consultants, 37. 
81
  Ibid 31. 
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The key question is therefore, what information does a buyer need to make a reasoned 
and rational decision to buy a property? ‘The administrative and compliance costs 
associated with information disclosure should not exceed the value of the information to 
the consumer’. 82  Behavioural economics places an emphasis on the use and 
understanding of the information to optimise the decision making process of the 
consumer. McAuley states: 
 
some regulation can be ineffective because of poor assessment of its impact, or worse, is 
costly in terms of imposing high compliance costs on firms. It is possible that behavioural 
economics can give some guidance as to how regulation can be imposed with a lighter 
hand. For example, when market failure is addressed in terms of conventional economics, 
there is often an inclination to require the disclosure of more information. The 
consequence of a surfeit of information can be information overload, and an opportunity 
for firms to engage in deliberate ‘confusopoly’.83 
 
The key factor in the purchase of any property is a determination by a buyer of the 
market price. The market price in legal terms is the price at which a willing vendor is 
prepared to sell and willing buyer is prepared to buy.
84
 This also assumes that both 
parties are cognisant of the attributes of the property that impact on price, which include: 
 
(i) Physical features such as the size of the land, nature and age of the 
improvements on the land (ie residence, commercial industrial);  
(ii) Factors impacting on the title to the land (encumbrances, title description, 
statutory changes, judgments or orders, resumptions); 
(iii) Factors impacting on the use of the land (planning and zoning, environmental, 
heritage, vegetation orders, building approvals, flooding, access); 
(iv) Factors impacting the quality of the improvements (structural defects, building 
materials, demolition orders). 
  
An analysis of the information currently provided to buyers under the various regimes 
by Christensen et al reveals 25 different types of information required to be disclosed 
including titling information, local government planning and building, heritage, 
contamination, resumptions, energy efficiency, building defects, and flooding.
85
 Despite 
this extensive list of factors to be disclosed, the authors also identify a number of gaps 
in the information which in some cases have lead to buyer’s being misled in the 
purchase of a property. A number of comments can be made about the list of 
information currently required to be disclosed: 
 
(i) All of the information a seller is required to disclose has the potential to impact 
on the price a buyer may be willing to pay the seller. 
(ii) In some cases the information may result in a buyer deciding not to purchase the 
property for a particular purposed, such as redevelopment. 
(iii) There is significant variation across the jurisdictions ranging from no statutory 
requirements in Queensland and Western Australia to statutory and contractual 
                                                 
82
  Ibid 133. 
83
  Above n 7, 18. 
84
  Spencer v Commonwealth (1907) 5 CLR 418, 441. 
85
  Christensen, Duncan and Stickley, above n 46. 
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obligations in New South Wales, Victoria, South Australia and the Australian 
Capital Territory. 
(iv) There is some consistency in the disclosure of matters related to planning and 
zoning, building approval and prohibitions, government or statutory notices, 
court judgements or orders, heritage issues, contamination and other 
environmental issues. 
(v) Other issues that a reasonable and rational consumer may however consider 
relevant are dealt with in an ad hoc manner:  
a. building and pest inspections and asbestos reports are only required in the 
Australian Capital Territory; 
b. the prospect of flooding is only required in New South Wales; and 
c. details of structural defects are not required in any jurisdiction. 
(vi) There is further evidence in the litigation emanating from the jurisdictions with 
mandatory disclosure that not all information a rational consumer considers 
relevant is being disclosed. 
(vii) The information required to be disclosed is in some states very extensive (New 
South Wales and the Australian Capital Territory) which can lead to disclosure 
statements being long and complex. 
 
Clearly, there is a need for government regulators to undertake qualitative research and 
analysis of the information most relevant to consumers of real estate. In keeping with 
the principle of asymmetric paternalism the resulting list of questions might be posed as 
follows: 
 
(i) What inquiries would a rational and reasonable consumer undertake when 
deciding whether to purchase and at what price? 
(ii) Is there additional information that a rational consumer, if told of the impact of 
the information on the value of the property require and use in making a decision 
to purchase? 
(iii) Is there further information that is easy and cost less to provide which would 
prevent a less than rational consumer from making a bad decision? 
 
To date no Australian research has been undertaken to determine the optimal 
information required by a consumer to make a rational decision or the additional 
information required to protect a less than rational consumer from making an unwise 
decision on a land purchase. Even the most recent analysis by the Tasmanian Law 
Reform Institute, which led to legislation that imposes mandatory disclosure on sellers 
of residential property, assumed that disclosure of more information to consumers of 
real estate was in their best interests.
86
 No evidence of the consumer need for the 
information or the form in which the information was more likely to be read was 
produced. The Institute’s assessment was based on the literature analysing the doctrine 
of caveat emptor and its impact on the information imbalance between seller and buyer. 
The report does not reveal any evidence of consumer disadvantage in Tasmania arising 
from the information imbalance nor does the report examine if any disadvantages are 
arising because of the behaviour of consumers in the real estate market. The resulting 
disclosure regime provides for an increased amount of information to be provided to 
                                                 
86
  Tasmanian Law Reform Institute, Vendor Disclosure, Report 5, September 2004 (2004) Faculty of 
Law University of Tasmania 
<http://www.law.utas.edu.au/reform/docs/VendDisFinRep200904_A4.pdf> at 21 December 2009. 
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consumers of real estate, and mirrors substantially the information required in South 
Australia.  
 
Does it follow that a buyer presented with all of this additional information relevant to 
the value of the property would use that information in deciding whether to buy and at 
what price? Should other safeguards, such as statutory warranties and cooling off 
periods be introduced to safeguard consumers who are overwhelmed by the information 
provided and are unable as a result to make an informed decision? 
 
B Framing 
 
Studies reveal that other factors in addition to the amount of information and detail 
impact upon a person’s decision as to whether they will read the document or not. The 
appearance of the document and its length also play a role in the decision.
87
 Research 
into information disclosure reveals that ‘the focus on sheer quantity of information also 
ignores the role of the form and display’.88 Therefore, testing of the document is an 
important step in the process of ensuring the provision of optimal information.  
 
None of the reports undertaken by Australian government bodies into vendor disclosure 
have tested the documents on their intended audience to determine whether the 
document is understandable, easy to use and effective. As noted by Howells and 
Weatherill, ‘the policy-maker should be wary of assumptions that (some, perhaps most) 
consumers are capable of absorbing relevant disclosed information.’89  
 
Followers of the emerging behavioural economic theory conclude that consumers do not 
understand or interpret situations as economists assume.
90
 Therefore, if information 
must be disclosed in order to protect the purchaser from making the wrong decision it 
should not be assumed that with that information the purchaser will take the rational 
course of action or that they will read or even rely upon the information with which the 
vendor has provided them. Therefore, it cannot be assumed that should the information 
disclose a defect in the property that the purchaser will have identified the defect or that 
they have understood the effect of the defect and will attempt to re-negotiate the 
purchase price or refuse to continue with the purchase.  
The first hurdle in designing the disclosure form is to ensure the consumer reads the 
form. Research in the United States has revealed that most consumers do not read 
contracts or disclosure forms.
91
 For example, research carried out on the adequacy of 
legal documents reported that 38% of the participant of the study had signed contracts 
and other legal documents without reading them.
92
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In the Unites States, studies reveal that consumers are more likely to read a form that is 
clear and streamlined. Disclosure structured as a simple checklist with space provided 
below each item for the seller to describe the nature and extent of any disclosed defects 
is more likely to be read than one which merely attaches a series of searches or 
certificates. One study of disclosure revealed that only 3% of buyers found the defect 
disclosure forms in such a style confusing, while 97% found them easy to understand or 
understandable.
93
  
 
Disclosure regimes in Australia adopt differing approaches to the form in which 
information is given to a buyer. In New South Wales, a seller of residential property is 
required to disclose a range of matters by attaching a combination of search information 
and certificates to the proposed contract of sale, supplemented by statutory warranties.
94
 
The documents are in the form obtained from each of the relevant authorities. There is 
no summary of the information disclosed and buyers regularly engage a lawyer to 
advise them in relation to the purchase. A failure to comply with the disclosure 
requirements permits a purchaser to rescind the contract by giving written notice within 
14 days of making the contract, unless the contract is completed.
95
 
 
The Australian Capital Territory under the Civil Law (Sale of Residential Property) Act 
2003 (ACT) adopts a similar approach to New South Wales. A seller is required to 
make ‘required documents’ available to a prospective buyer for inspection at ‘all 
reasonable times’ during the offer period and failure to do so is an offence.96  
 
Proposed legislation in the Northern Territory will require a vendor to have the required 
disclosure documents available for inspection and allows for rescission of the contract 
by written notice if the disclosure documents are not made available.
97
 
 
Victoria and South Australia adopt vendor statements. In Victoria, s 32(1) of the Sale of 
Land Act 1962 (Vic) provides for a seller to give a very comprehensive statement of 
matters affecting the land to the buyer before the buyer signs the contract of sale and 
include in the contract a statement of those matters.
98
 In addition to the statement 
prepared by the seller certain specified attachments are required to accompany the 
statement, being a copy of the certificate of title, evidence of the seller’s power of sale 
where the seller is not the registered owner, evidence of subdivisional approval (where 
relevant) or evidence of progress toward subdivision (as relevant).
99
 A failure to supply 
all the necessary information entitles the purchaser to rescind the contract.
100
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In South Australia, a seller is required to serve a statement upon the buyer in a 
prescribed form.
101
 The prescribed form is more detailed than in Victoria essentially 
requiring the seller to disclose any matter affecting, presently or prospectively, title to, 
or possession or enjoyment of the land. All particulars required by the prescribed form 
must be disclosed on the form unless a copy of the document with all details is attached 
to the statement. The prescribed form is upward of 25 pages of close type with 
numerous statements in relation to cooling off and other rights together with 
information concerning encumbrances and defects. If a vendor statement is not provided 
or does not comply with requirements, a purchaser may apply to court to rescind the 
contract if the court is satisfied that the purchaser has been prejudiced by the failure.
102
 
 
In 2005, Tasmania passed the Property Agents and Land Transactions Act 2005 
(Tas).
103
 The requirements of vendor disclosure are similar to those of the Australian 
Capital Territory in that s 186 requires a vendor to have specific documents available 
while the property is on offer for sale and s 197 implies certain conditions into the 
contract. If the disclosure requirements are not met a purchaser is entitled to rescind the 
contract at any time before settlement without penalty by serving a written notice.
104
 If a 
condition of the contract under s 197 is breached a purchaser may rescind the contract 
or seek damages if the breach causes a loss of 5% or more of the value of the land.
105
 
 
There are a number of decisions in New South Wales, Victoria and South Australia that 
indicate buyers are often misled by both types of vendor disclosure due to the 
uncertainty of legislation and also the complexity of the disclosure itself. An example of 
a buyer being misled by uncertain legislation occurred in Jones v Sherle
106
 where the 
buyer of a property in New South Wales argued that the seller failed to disclose a 
declaration under s 55 of the Public Health Act 1902 (NSW) in relation to a flooding 
problem which adversely affected the property. Such disclosure, it was argued, was 
required by virtue of the warranties implied by s 52A(2)(b) of the Conveyancing Act 
1919 (NSW) which at the time of contract warranted that the there was no ‘declaration 
under s 55 of the Public Health Act 1902’. The Supreme Court refused the claim 
because at the date of contract the Public Health Act 1902 had been repealed and 
replaced by the Unhealthy Building Land Act 1990 (NSW). 
An example of a buyer being misled due to the complexity of the disclosure occurred in 
Argy v Blunts & Lane Cove Real Estate Pty Ltd,
107
 where a copy of the local 
government certificate required to be given was not properly faxed from the real estate 
agents to the solicitors for the seller, one page having been omitted inadvertently in the 
fax received. The buyers were misled and entered into the contract prior to discovery of 
the mistake. Similarly in Butcher v Lachlan Elder Real Estate
108
 the buyer despite 
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receiving a certificate as required by the NSW legislation proceeded to purchase the 
property despite the inconsistencies in the information provided in the certificate and the 
information in the sales brochure about the boundaries of the property. 
 
There is evidence in these cases and others
109
 that a majority of buyers are unable to 
interpret and use significant quantities of information leading to later claims for 
misleading conduct rather than buyer’s utilising the termination provisions established 
by the disclosure regimes. Therefore, if the provision of information is mandated then it 
is also necessary to mandate the use of plain English and the manner of presentation. If 
the way the information is communicated is not also regulated it opens up the 
possibility for complicated legal language to be used to attempt to shroud the meaning 
of the information from a purchaser.
110
 It is now well-accepted that legal documents 
should be in plain English, but the uniqueness of the legal language does provide 
opportunities for information to be provided in compliance with legislation in such a 
way that a lay person would have difficulty understanding. 
 
C Anchoring and Investment 
 
The timing of the disclosure of the information is also relevant if consumers are to take 
advantage of the information. Cognitive psychological studies reveal that individuals 
discount late information and tend to persist in transactions once they have made a 
commitment. Studies of hypothetical business ventures reveal that consumers tend to 
continue to invest once they have made initial investments despite later information that 
counsels for withdrawal.
111
 Education about the sunk costs does not reduce the tendency 
to persist with a course of action.
112
 On the basis of the psychological evidence, Stern 
advocates that early disclosure of information has greater impact on a purchaser’s 
decision making. Disclosure that takes place after committing to a contract has less 
effect than early disclose because: 
 
People tend to persist in their actions even when the costs increase or the benefits 
diminish, and they frequently escalate their commitments to failing course of action. 
Individuals also appear to have greater difficulty processing latecoming information 
because they over utilize early information - ‘or’ anchors – in their decision making. 
These psychological biases towards behavioral compliance, escalating commitment, and 
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anchoring suggest that latecoming disclosure has a dramatically reduced impact on 
decision making.
113
  
 
Studies have shown that even educated persons aware of the effect of the disclosed 
information display a ‘deep-rooted response to latecoming information’.114 Therefore, if 
any defects in relation to the property are disclosed to a purchaser after they have signed 
a contract to purchase, purchasers are less likely to re-negotiate the purchase price. This 
is also likely to indicate that cooling off periods are also not likely to be utilised by 
buyers despite the discovery of adverse information. This behaviour goes against the 
theory that consumers act rationally and will utilise information disclosed to negotiate a 
purchase price that takes into account the disclosed defects. It is because of this 
behaviour that a purchaser will usually still pay more than the value of the property if 
the defect is disclosed late in the transaction. 
 
As analysed by Griggs
115
 the disclosure legislation in Australia falls into three 
categories: 
 
(i) Disclosure prior to contract signing – Australian Capital Territory and Tasmania; 
(ii) Disclosure around or at the time of contract signing – New South Wales and 
Victoria; and 
(iii) Disclosure after signing of contract and before settlement – South Australia.116 
 
Griggs argues that the jurisdictions with disclosure after or around the time of contract 
are not as favourable to buyers, because by this time buyers have invested time and 
money into the choice of property and are less likely to exercise rights of termination 
when faced with adverse information.  
 
The likelihood that a buyer may not act on latecoming information is further impacted 
by the preconditions to rights of termination within the regimes. For example, in New 
South Wales, a buyer is given a right to terminate the contract provided: 
 
(i) the right is exercised prior to settlement; 
(ii) the buyer was unaware of the matter at the time of contract; 
(iii) the buyer would not have entered into the contract if they had been aware of the 
matter; and 
(iv) the buyer has not with knowledge of the inaccuracy of the warranty affirmed the 
contract.
117
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The imposition of these restrictions on a buyer’s right of termination for the seller’s 
failure to disclose assumes that a buyer, acting properly, will need to verify the 
information disclosed and verify the accuracy of the warranties given by the seller. If 
the information is not checked and the matter comes to light after settlement no rights 
against the seller will exist. This increases the investment cost of the buyer prior to 
discovering adverse information through confirmatory searches.  
 
V CONCLUSIONS 
 
All Australian jurisdictions, in line with those overseas, have recognised a need to 
augment the right of a purchaser of residential property to receive information about the 
property over and above that which the vendor may have been obligated to provide 
under the general law. This has been due not only to the increase in the array of 
government regulation of land use and transactions, but also the growing tide of 
consumer awareness. 
 
Previous regulatory responses by governments to the dilemma of information 
asymmetry between vendor and purchaser have relied upon traditional economic theory, 
perceived market imbalance and political and social pressure to justify intervention in 
the market place. This has resulted in obligations on vendors in most jurisdictions to 
disclose voluminous and often complex information to buyers in formats that do not 
ensure buyers will read and understand the information. 
 
The PEM recommended by the Productivity Commission aims to implement a more 
holistic approach by incorporating a consideration of market characteristics, analysis of 
information failures and a consideration of consumer behaviour. While adopting the 
PEM results in the same identification of an information deficit in residential property 
transactions, a regulator’s understanding of the nature and extent of the problem should 
be enhanced. As demonstrated by this article, the use of the PEM, and therefore a 
consideration of consumer behaviour, highlights a number of deficiencies in the current 
disclosure regimes, primarily centring on the failure to ensure information is relevant 
and presented appropriately.  
 
Studies in the United States have shown the importance of framing information in a 
clear way using plain English.
118
 Whether buyers understood the disclosure had a 
positive impact on the number of unanticipated problems found with the property after 
settlement.
119
 Therefore, mandatory disclosure regimes should avoid simply attempting 
to supply the purchaser with all possible information. A consideration must be had of: 
 
 When the information is given to the purchaser; 
 Whether the information is relevant to the transaction; 
 Whether the information is helpful and useful and would assist a purchaser in 
making an informed decision about entering into the transaction; 
 Whether the information is in plain English and able to be processed and understood 
by the purchaser; and 
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 Whether the layout of the document assists the purchaser in reading. 
 
The analysis also highlights the need for some buyers, who either fail to read or 
understand the disclosure to be given additional protection. Vulnerable consumers can 
be protected either through statutory warranties in relation to important attributes of the 
property or a cooling off period. However, the tendency of consumers to remain in 
transactions once committed may suggest that statutory warranties, which provide rights 
of termination or compensation is a better choice. 
 
This article demonstrates that whilst there is some consistency in approach by the 
various governments concerned, the overall picture reveals idiosyncratic requirements 
and no evidence of any attempt to analyse the effectiveness or the usefulness of the 
actual disclosure in any case. Clearly, the implementation of an effective disclosure 
regime for residential property requires evidence based research of consumer behaviour 
in the context of information disclosure. There is no evidence that any State or Territory 
government which has adopted a disclosure regime in Australia
120
 has undertaken 
consumer research to determine what is the optimal level of information from the point 
of view of balancing the usefulness of the information and its practical effectiveness. 
This suggests a need for a moratorium upon any additional legislation of this kind, or 
for that matter any changes, until there is some understanding as to the objectives and 
effectiveness of vendor disclosure in the residential property market.  
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